As African militaries embrace drones as weapons of choice, the sobering reality is that they are not an answer to proliferation of conflicts on the continent.

A report published by the African Centre for Strategic Studies on May 2, says African governments need to develop a more complex understanding of the risks and limitations of using armed drones and adapt their doctrine accordingly.

The report explains that experience from theatres in Africa where drones are most used suggests that unmanned systems face major challenges against dispersed insurgencies that adopt guerrilla warfare tactics.

The adaptation of the drones by governments to quell insurgency, thee militants have in turn devised of ways limiting military attacks by spreading the military capacity thin. In response, the reports says, militants have adjusted their tactics, regrouping to areas out of reach of easy aerial surveillance, spreading out their forces and exploiting the inability of overstretched government ground forces to hold territory by deploying age-old hit-and-run guerrilla attacks.

Reproduced below by Tell Media is a part the report:

Even as drones – which have become a military option of choice – demonstrate superior operational effectiveness against certain types of adversaries, their use is not necessarily decisive to conflict outcomes. There are several reasons why.

The utility of Turkish-made MALE drones against armed groups that use guerrilla tactics and seek to blend in with the population is limited. This dynamic has been illustrated in Somalia, where drone strikes by the United States and, more recently, Türkiye, have helped the Federal Government of Somalia retake territory from al Shabaab and the Islamic State Somalia.

These strikes include the killing of Al Shabaab’s leader Ahmed Abdi Godane in a US drone strike in 2014, as well as more recent offensives in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states.

Any decisive advantage drones may provide may be further negated by the dynamics of proxy warfare. The growing role of external actors in African conflicts has brought a surge of additional resources to match the technological innovation that rival actors may deploy via drones. While this may keep their preferred side in the fight, the proxy nature of these conflicts prevents a decisive victory. This has been the case in Libya, which was the world’s pre-eminent drone theatre between 2016 and 2020.

Although Bayraktar TB2s supplied to the GNA were crucial in halting the LNA offensive, the GNA possessed insufficient combat power to retake the east of the country from the LNA. This was in part due to the existence of the LNA’s own drone arsenal and support from Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. Although the battle for Tripoli ended in 2020, Libya remains mired in instability and political fragmentation.

There were 484 drone strikes resulting in 1,176 casualties across 13 African countries in 2024. Sudan (264) and the Sahelian countries (145) collectively accounted for 84 per cent of this total.

In both regions, Turkish MALE drones acquired by weakened military governments have helped hold or take back territory. Moreover, proxy war dynamics are evident in Sudan, where both the SAF and RSF have acquired robust, externally supplied drone arsenals.

The integration of drones at the tactical level is a relatively new development, particularly in Sudan. The country’s flat terrain with limited cover makes it conducive to drone warfare, and both the SAF and RSF have rapidly moved to acquire and produce unmanned systems. SAF has heavily relied on its advantages in manned and unmanned aircraft since the outset of the war and has been responsible for over 90 per cent of all recorded drone strikes in Sudan.

Precision strikes by Turkish TB2s and Iranian Mohajer and Ababil drones, which are easy to deploy and can fly low to evade radar detection, have been crucial to the success of SAF offensives that pushed RSF forces out of populated areas in and around Khartoum in late 2024 and 2025. Sudan also produces the Kamin-25 First Person View (FPV) kamikaze drone, a loitering munition unveiled in 2023 by Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation.

Although it does not have an air force, the RSF has acquired its own drone arsenal, including Chinese CH-4 MALE multipurpose combat drones, Serbian Yugoimport mortar-armed drones supplied by the UAE, FPV quadcopter multipurpose drones possibly supplied by Russia, Chinese-made Sunflower suicide drones, and swarming loitering munitions of unknown origin.

In 2023 and early 2024, the RSF employed its arsenal sparingly, using them to conduct strikes into areas considered safe in order to stretch SAF defences, such as the one that nearly killed Burhan. However, beginning in September 2024, the RSF conducted a series of drone swarm attacks on El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. In March 2025, the SAF claimed that it shot down more than “100 drones in 10 days,” suggesting that the RSF may be cultivating a mass drone production capability.

The proliferation of small, commercial drones may also be facilitating the weaponisation of small, tactical drones by militant groups in the Sahel. Throughout 2023 and 2024, militant groups including the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara and Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) coalition began to use drones to drop improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on rival and government forces.

In February 2025, JNIM reportedly used small FPV drones to drop IEDs made from plastic bottles onto military positions during an attack on Djibo, Burkina Faso.

The growing use of drones by armed non-state actors in Africa indicates that the technological advantage that governments typically hold is being increasingly challenged. The weaponisation of more widely accessible commercial drones may further benefit armed non-state actors. To respond, African security forces will urgently need to adopt counter-drone capabilities. This includes detection systems such as radar and acoustic sensors, electronic warfare systems such as jamming and GPS spoofing, and physical countermeasures such as net guns and kinetic interceptors.

Unmanned systems face major challenges against dispersed insurgencies that adopt guerrilla warfare tactics.

More fundamentally, African governments need to develop a more complex understanding of the risks and limitations of using armed drones and adapt their doctrine accordingly. Experience from theatres in Africa where drones are most used suggests that unmanned systems face major challenges against dispersed insurgencies that adopt guerrilla warfare tactics.

African governments that use drones must still deploy effective ground forces as drones cannot occupy or govern territory.

Drones are establishing themselves as the 21st century’s defining military system. Managing the rapid proliferation of unmanned systems, however, will require sound strategic decisions on the part of human beings.

• A Tell Media report / Courtesy of Africa Centre for Strategic Studies