While speaking at Liberation Day celebrations in Kampala, January 26, 1999. President Yoweri Museveni, said:

“Unlike the law of Moses, most human rights are not divinely ordained and are subject to modification to fit the political and socio-economic conditions of the societies where they are applied”.

This was in direct conflict with Uganda constitution (1995), Article 20 (1), which states that fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual are inherent and not granted by the State.

What the president was implying was that even if the constitution says so, his government, and for that matter, the state can come in and encroach on article 20 (1) if only to achieve the political aims of his militarily-oriented regime.

Since then, a complex web of legal restrictions limits political opposition in Uganda. The new Ugandan constitution, adopted in 1995, allows political parties to exist in name but outlaws all the activities normally associated with political parties. Political organisations are prohibited from opening and operating branch offices, holding delegates’ conferences, and holding public rallies. Political organisations are further prohibited from “sponsoring or offering a platform to or in any way campaigning for or against a candidate for any public elections.”

Finally, a vague clause prohibits political organisations from “carrying on any activities that may interfere with the movement political system for the time being in force.” There is no evidence to suggest that there has been a change to free political parties fully. Their members continue to be kidnapped and confined in places that may be exclusive from civility. Some obnoxious laws are in place to keep alternative leaders and their followers under constant fear.

Besides, army representation in parliament continues to this day. Uganda is the only country on the globe with a parliamentary system where serving soldiers are in parliament.  Army representation in Uganda’s parliament began in 1994. As things stand now, 10 seats are set aside for ‘serving officers’ of the Uganda People’s Defence Force. The 10 are chosen by the Army Council, chaired by President Yoweri Tibuhaburwa Museveni, and they tend to vote with the ruling party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), thus increasing the “Museveni” majority in parliament. .

Many voices have been raised against army representation in parliament to no avail, because President Tibuhaburwa Museveni has not seen any reason why the army should be out of parliament:

“We want the word ‘army’ deleted among parliament representatives” (MP Wandera Ogallo cited by Halima Athumani, 2015).

“I am not aware of any parliament in the world where the army elects representatives to sit in parliament” (Wandera Ogallo, cited by Haima Athumani, 2015).

Voices from the NRM and army, however, insist differently:

“The army is the vanguard of this democracy we are enjoying, so why do you want to deny them that right? (Fred Mwesigye, former Army MP, cited by Haima Athumani, 2015).

“Their [army MPs’] presence in parliament is symbolic; it bridges the relationship between the people and army,” Fred Mwesigye, former Army MP, cited by Halima Athumani, 2025)

“As long as the NRM remains in power, the army will stay in parliament,” (Fred Mwesigye, former Army MP, cited by Halima Athumani, 2015).

“What you call parliament was a military council that was expanded by adding civilians to it” (Charles Rwomushana, cited by Anadolu Agency quoted by Halima Athumani, 2015).

“The decisions that Museveni makes in the NRM caucus that he chairs are those that parliament passes,” (Charles Rwomushana, cited by Anadolu Agency quoted by Halima Athumani, 2015)

“Our civilian legislators think that by voting, shouting and legal drafting they are working – but it’s the army. In essence,” he added, “we don’t have a people’s parliament.” (Charles Rwomushana, Cited by Anadolu Agency quoted by Halima Athumani, 2015).

Professor Paul Omach, in his 2009 article “Democratisation and Conflict Resolution in Uganda” argues that the NRA/M used democratic reforms to reconfigure the Ugandan state and politics to consolidate itself in power and to hoodwink western donors.

Anders Sjögren (2013) notes the important role of the military in Uganda’s politics and the historical institutionalisation of the military in the Ugandan state.

Oweyegha-Afunaduula (2024) concerned himself with the military capture of Uganda’s civic space yesterday and today. Among the captured spaces he included the judicial common space and the legislative space. The judicial common space is where both lower and higher judges administer justice preferably without the interference of the other arms of government (the Executive and the Legislature). The legislature is where elected members of parliament or parliament -like bodies meet to make laws, consider policies and monitor whether government is functioning properly. It is possible for both the Executive and the Legislature to combine forces to interfere in judicial processes by making and unmaking laws to render judicial processes null and void.

When something is made null and void, it means something is completely invalid, has no legal force, or is considered as if it never existed; essentially, it is completely ineffective or without any binding power. For example, on 31 January 2025, justice, the judiciary and the human rights of Ugandans were simultaneously liberated from the fangs of executive and its military when the justices of the High Court of Uganda ruled that trying civilians in the military martial court was unconstitutional and, therefore illegal.

However, both the President of Uganda, Tibuhaburwa Museveni and the Chief of Defense Forces (CDF) Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who is his son, expressed displeasure regarding the ruling. The president promised to take necessary action to ensure that civilians continued to be tried by the Military Martial Court by changing the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces Act accordingly. The CDF saif the ultimate decision would be made by the High Command of the UPDF. The prominent members of the high command are the President who is the Commander-in-Chief of the Uganda Armed Forces, His half brother, Akandwanaho Salim Saleh Caleb, and Muhoozi Kainerugaba himself).

As I write this article, the Chairman of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and President of Uganda has summoned members of his NRM Caucus in Parliament to a meeting at State House on 21 February 2025 to consider, among other things, changing the UPDF Act, ostensibly to convert the Military tribunal into a military court, for the purpose of including civilians under its jurisdiction. This an example of where the majority NRM members in parliament can connive with the Executive to distort democratisation, parliamentary processes and judicial decisions in favour of power. It will be surprising if the NRM Caucus in Parliament does not endorse the wish of the President to continue trying civilians in the military court, who might be some of the members of the caucus.

The question remains: How independent are the legislature and the judiciary free from military and executive interferences and distortions? Why do we bother our people to engage in elections if their representees are subordinate to the army, and everything flows from and to President Tibuhaburwa Museveni?

From what I have written so far Uganda and its people, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary remain firmly under the grip of the military with veneer of civility to hoodwink the voters that they are participating in their governance and leadership, and especially those who give aid to the government to continue believing that democratisation in Uganda is on course.

If we are to take the voices of Charles Rwomushana, a former president of Makerere University Students Guild and a former worker at State House, and Fred Mwesigye, a former UPDF Member of Parliament, what we call democratisation in Uganda is firmly under the army, the vanguard of democracy (Mwesigye, 2015), the army is the bridge between the people and itself in parliament (Mwesigye, 2015); what we call parliament was a military council simply expanded to include civilians (Rwomushana, 2015) the decisions that Museveni makes in the NRM caucus that he chairs are those that parliament passes (Rwomushana, 2015); in essence we do not have a people’s Parliament in Uganda (Rwomushana, 2015).

We have the army with a veneer of civility expressed in so-called representatives of the people. With the refusal of the CDF to appear before Parliament recently in connection with the UPDF budget, a process of de-parliamentarisation may already be on course with regard to the scrutiny function of Parliament (e.g., Mehmet KABASAKAL,2019). just as vulnerable Ugandans are made to believe that they are represented in Parliament and that elections are the pathway to effective representation.

Therefore, the current conflict between the Executive, Judiciary and Members of Parliament regarding the unfortunate case involving President Tibuhaburwa Museveni, his son who is the Chief of Defense Forces, Muhoozi Kainerugaba and the NRM Caucus in Parliament regarding Kiiza Besigye has constitutional explanation: raising the army over and above civilians  and giving the impression that Uganda is democratising, that the people are represented in Parliament and that judicial decisions are final in settling socio-political and other conflicts in Uganda.

So, when one day the President insisted, he is not a servant of anybody he was right. Constitutionally, it is the people of Uganda who are his servants, whether they are judges, legislators or voters. He is the beginning and end of everything in Uganda, as the High Court ruling of 31st January will soon confirm. Are we in a constitutional crisis caused by the Uganda Constitution 1995?

Which way uganda in the 21st century?

For God and my country.

• A Tell report / By Oweyegha-Afunaduula / Environmental Historian and Conservationist Centre for Critical Thinking and Alternative Analysis (CCTAA), Seeta, Mukono, Uganda.

About the Centre for Critical Thinking and Alternative Analysis (CCTAA)

The CCTAA was innovated by Hyuha Mukwanason, Oweyegha-Afunaduula and Mahir Balunywa in 2019 to the rising decline in the capacity of graduates in Uganda and beyond to engage in critical thinking and reason coherently besides excellence in academics and academic production. The three scholars were convinced that after academic achievement the world outside the ivory tower needed graduates that can think critically and reason coherently towards making society and the environment better for human gratification. They reasoned between themselves and reached the conclusion that disciplinary education did not only narrow the thinking and reasoning of those exposed to it but restricted the opportunity to excel in critical thinking and reasoning, which are the ultimate aim of education. They were dismayed by the truism that the products of disciplinary education find it difficult to tick outside the boundaries of their disciplines; that when they provide solutions to problems that do not recognise the artificial boundaries between knowledges, their solutions become the new problems. They decided that the answer was a new and different medium of learning and innovating, which they characterised as “The Centre for Critical Thinking and Alternative Analysis” (CCTAA).

Further reading

Agrey Mutambo (2025). Besigye Detention: Museveni Digs in> The East African, 18 February 2025 https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/besigye-detention-museveni-digs-in-4932002 Visited on 18 February 2025 at 20:46 pm EAT.

Anders Sjögren (2013). Between Militarism and Technocratic Governance. State Formation in Contemporary Uganda. FOUNTAIN PUBLISHERS: THE NORDIC AFRICA INSTITUTE https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:586461/FULLTEXT01.pdf Visited on 18 February 2025 at 19: 46 pm EAT.

Carmel Rickard (2019). Army Officers Keep thei Parliamentary Seats in Uganda. Open Law Africa, 1 August 2019, https://africanlii.org/articles/2019-08-01/carmel-rickard/army-officers-keep-their-10-parliamentary-seats-in-uganda Visited on 19 February 2025 at 18:13 pm EAT.

Christian Bjørnskov (2017). Why Do Military Dictatorships Become Presidential Democracies? Mapping the Democratic Interests of Autocratic Regimes. IFN Working Paper No. 1194, 2017. https://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp1194.pdf Visited on 20 February 2025 at 12:97 pm EAT.

Daron Acemoglu Davide Ticchi Andrea Vindigni (2008). A Theory of Military Dictatorships. NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH Working Paper 13915 http://www.nber.org/papers/w13915

Derrick Kiyonga (2023). Examining the place of the Military in Judicial Processes. Daily Monitor, February 11 2023. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/examining-the-military-s-place-in-judicial-processes-4120104 Visited on 20 February 2025 at 12:50 pm EAT

Halima Athumani (2015). Uganda’s Army MPs: Vanguard of Democracy or Time Bomb? AA, May 22 2015. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/ugandas-army-mps-vanguard-of-democracy-or-time-bomb/44753 Visited on 18 February 2025 at 19:04 pm EAT.

Harold Trinkunas (2013). Building Democratic Militaries. Journal of Democracy, 24(1):

Williams, Lethia, and Daniel Masters. “Assessing Military Intervention and Democratization: Supportive Versus Oppositional Military Interventions.” Democracy and Security 7, no. 1 (2011): 18–37. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48602680.

Linda Njoroge (2025). Oweyegha-Afunaduula: What it means to liberate Justice from The Military in Uganda. Ultimate News, February 3 2025, https://ultimatenews.co.ug/2025/02/oweyegha-afunaduula-what-it-means-to-liberate-justice-from-the-military-in-uganda/ Visited on 18 February 2025 at 20:21 pm EAT.

Mehmet KABASAKAL1 (2019). Deparliamentarization in Turkey: A Major D ecline in the Scrutiny Function. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/669625 Visited on 20 February 2025 at 12:33 pm EAT.

Muhammed Matovu (2024). Museveni Defends trial of Civilians in Military Court Marshal. Nile Post, 12 December er 2024, https://nilepost.co.ug/news/232659/museveni-defends-trial-of-civilians-in-court-martial Visited on 18 February 2025 at 20:38 pm EAT.

Oweyegha-Afunaduula (2024). The Military Capture of Uganda’s Civic Space Yesterday and Today. Uganda Today, March 25 2024 https://ugandatoday.co.ug/the-military-capture-of-ugandas-civic-space-yesterday-and-today/ Visited on 18 February 2025 at 20:16 pm EAT.

Oweyegha-Afunaduula (2025). Militarization of Justice in Uganda: The Case of Ero Kiiza, Uganda Radio Network, 2025 https://ugandaradionetwork.com/s/militarisation-of-justice-in-uganda-the-case-of-eron-kizza/ Visited 18 February 2025 at 20:33 pm EAT.

Ozan O. Varol (2013). The Military as the Guardian of Constitutional Democracy. Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 50, Summer 2013

Lewis & Clark Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2012-30

Paul Omach (2009).  Democratisation and Conflict Resolution in Uganda, The East African Review, 41 2009 https://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/576 Visited on 18

Sharan Grewal (2023). When do militaries undermine democratisation? Brookings, November 3 2023. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/when-do-militaries-undermine-democratization/ Visited on 20 February 2025 at 11:54 am EAT.

Ronald Naluwairo (2012). Military courts and human rights: A critical analysis of the compliance of Uganda’s military justice with the right to an independent and impartial tribunal. AHRLJ Volume 12 No 2 2012 https://www.ahrlj.up.ac.za/naluwairo-r Visited on 20 February 2025 at 12:56 pm EAT.

Sharan Grewal (2023). Soldiers of Democracy? Military Legacies and the Arab Spring. Brookings, October 25 2023, https://www.brookings.edu/books/soldiers-of-democracy/ Visited on 20 February 2025 at 11:58 pm EAT.

UNHCR and REFWORLD (1999). Hostile to Democracy: The Movement System and Political Repression in Uganda. 1 October 1999, https://www.refworld.org/reference/countryrep/hrw/1999/en/40531 Visited on 18 February 2025 at 18:22 pm EAT.

Zoltan Barany (2012). The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Princeton University Press, 2012. 472 pp.