Nigerian transnational criminal organisation Black Axe’s foreign cells operate more autonomously and often will not send money back to the national body in Nigeria, according Interpol investigations report.

This has contributed to tension within the organisation and caused the national body to place a ban on recruitment in Europe and particularly in Italy where the Cosa Nostra and the Camorra mafia syndicates allow local Black Axe cells to operate on their territory in exchange for a cut of their profits.

Exploiting vulnerable members of the Nigerian diaspora is a key part of Black Axe’s operations. Axemen routinely coerce or convince Nigerian migrants to take part in their money laundering activities. Sometimes this consists of forcing migrants to use their bank accounts to receive ill-gotten funds. In other instances, migrants become veritable “money mules” who help to funnel cash to launderers.

In South America, Black Axe similarly uses Nigerian and Venezuelan migrants to traffic cocaine to Nigeria and Europe via plane. Finally, Black Axe has been involved in the prostitution of Nigerian women, as part of the sex trafficking industry in Italy and France.

Black Axe exploits vulnerable populations, particularly young men, in Nigeria as well. Here, it uses young, low-level gang members, known as “streets,” to fight over territory, control illicit markets and steal oil from pipelines. Oil bunkering in Nigeria is estimated to have generated $46 billion in proceeds between 2009 and 2020. Funds gained from such illicit activities allow Black Axe’s leadership to integrate themselves within the Nigerian political system and forge networks of patrimonialism.

Funds gained from illicit activities allow Black Axe’s leadership to integrate themselves within the Nigerian political system.

The roles certain Black Axe leaders play in both overseeing Black Axe’s criminal activity and Nigerian political life highlights the challenges of investigating and prosecuting Black Axe in Nigeria. Evidence leaked by hacker “Uche” Tobias demonstrates that Bemigho Eyeoyibo was both the president of NBM and the head of Black Axe from 2012 to 2016. Even after this information was made public, Eyeoyibo was allowed to run for office as a member of the All Progressives Congress (APC) in 2019.

Another well-known Axeman, Tony Nwoye, reportedly stole state funds for Black Axe but was permitted to remain chairman of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Anambra State. Finally, the prominent “godfather” of Edo State, Tony Kabaka, who is a member of both NBM and the APC, is also thought to be affiliated with Black Axe.

Securing the support of godfathers like Kabaka is tremendously important for politicians in Nigeria. Godfathers provide politicians with money and political machinery to mobilise support for candidates. Some may also use manpower from gangs and criminal groups like Black Axe to intimidate opponents and serve as enforcers. In return, political proteges grant godfathers access to public funds and political influence once elected.

While Interpol has successfully coordinated sting operations against Black Axe abroad, efforts to curb Black Axe in Nigeria have been largely unsuccessful. The federal government enacted the Secret Cult and Similar Activities Prohibition Act in 2004, which serves as a blueprint for countering illicit cultist activity. Several other states have also passed laws outlawing cultism with Edo State police deploying a Special Task Force on Anti-Cultism. In 2021, Lagos State’s governor signed a new law that would punish the parents of youths convicted of involvement in cult-related activity.

These policy actions demonstrate a degree of political will to confront Black Axe within Nigeria. Many Nigerians despise and feel directly threatened by criminal groups like Black Axe. Communities across the country have spearheaded efforts to mobilize traditional, educational, and religious institutions to dissuade young men from criminal activity. Vigilante groups also round up suspected gang members and deliver them to local police. These efforts have resulted in thousands of low-level arrests. However, a culture of impunity persists around prosecuting criminal groups like the Black Axe given that that many senior officials, jurists, and law enforcement officers at both the state and federal level are confraternity members.

A culture of impunity persists around prosecuting criminal groups like the Black Axe given that that many senior officials, jurists, and law enforcement officers are confraternity members.

Groups like NBM along with the National Association of Airlords and the Green Circuit Association (the respective legal parent organisations of the criminal Supreme Eiye Confraternity and the Maphites) have millions of members. Membership to precolonial secret societies like the Ogboni and Owegbe, which tend to work against state interests, can be joined while also being a confraternity member.

Nigeria therefore sees few convictions with one police commissioner in Edo saying, ‘‘each time we arrest members they remain in custody and then we receive a call … [from] people at the top level of state government, politicians … we have to liberate them.” Meanwhile, lacking oversight, state-level police and security forces often use anti-cultist legislation to crack down on legitimate student movements and youth protests.

Italy is perhaps the most important success story of a country that managed to effectively confront ubiquitous and embedded criminality. In 1982, the Italian Parliament enacted Article 416-bis of the Penal Code which defined mafia-type organisations and established minimum prison sentences for those found to belong to such groups. The country also established the Anti-Mafia Investigation Directorate (DIA), the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism Directorate (DNA), along with the Anti-Mafia Code in 2011 that allowed law enforcement to strike at the financial foundations of mafia operations by making it easier for police to seize ill-gotten money and valuables.

Italy also relied on nonstate actors (including the private sector and the Church) and civil society organisations like Addiopizzo and Libera to protect mafia victims and informants, support businesses affected by racketeering, and redistribute confiscated assets to communities. These actions eroded the tacit support criminal organisations once enjoyed in country’s south and helped Italy overcome its historic “mafia culture.”

In other instances, progress against organised crime has come because of international cooperation. In 2006, for instance, the government of Guatemala and the United Nations established the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), building the Guatemalan judiciary’s capacity to confront political corruption and criminal gangs. The CICIG had some notable successes: it prosecuted dozens of high-level cases, identified 70 criminal structures, and possibly prevented between 20,000-30,000 deaths.

CICIG was ended in 2019 by then President Jimmy Morales after the Commission began investigating his campaign for illicit financing. The CICIG has since been criticised by some for failing to reform the Guatemalan judiciary, improve police investigative capacity, and bolster public prosecutors’ ability to crack down on organised crime.

Other initiatives have emphasised equipping state judiciaries with the necessary tools to help them confront organised crime independently. Before it was terminated by the Malian military junta in 2023, the UN peacekeeping operation, MINUSMA, established the Judicial Unit for Terrorism and Transnational Organised Crime that aimed to provide Malian prosecutors and law enforcement with logistical and informational support needed to prosecute criminals, terrorists, and their political sponsors.

A 2024 initiative in Haiti, supported by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, succeeded in creating new “judicial pools.” These are legal bodies comprised of local prosecutors who are given financial and operational resources from international partners to fast-track important cases and act against leading criminals. Under UN Resolution 2653, the Haitian government has also worked with foreign actors, particularly the United States and Canada, to impose targeted sanctions on violent gangs’ key political patrons.

Given the political interference limiting prosecutions of Black Axe crimes in Nigeria, the federal and state governments will need to augment their existing legislation to better insulate the judiciary from criminal intimidation. This may entail establishing an autonomous judicial unit to prosecute leading Black Axe figures and their political allies.

Nigeria may also consider working with international partners to impose sanctions on public figures recognized as Black Axe patrons to reduce the political leverage these figures wield, as was done to prominent gang sponsors in Haiti.

Combatting Black Axe will also entail a major public outreach campaign enlisting community, religious, traditional, and educational leaders to raise awareness of the threat posed by criminal organisations immersed within confraternities—and dissuading youth from joining.

Scrutiny is needed on governments in China and the United Arab Emirates that serve as major financial transfer hubs for Black Axe’s illicit transactions.

At the international level, Interpol’s multi-country operations have hindered Black Axe’s activities and will remain important. Interpol may also consider widening its net of international police partnerships to include more African countries given that Black Axe maintains a presence in several African countries that were not a part of its previous operations.

Businesses in Africa and abroad could also do more to sensitise their employees to BEC scams. Companies could likewise consider using software that recognises suspicious emails and deploys chatbots to allow law enforcement to gather information on their activities.

Finally, growing scrutiny is needed on governments in China and the United Arab Emirates that serve as major financial transfer hubs for Black Axe’s illicit transactions. Stronger fiscal oversight within these financial hubs could significantly constrain Black Axe’s financial flows, cutting into its revenue streams and operational capacity.

• A Tell report / Republished with permission from Africa Centre for Strategic Studies/ By Dr Matthew La Lime – research associate with ACSS.