Rwanda-backed M23 Rebel leaders have put forward various demands at different stages. They include: an amnesty for past violence; the integration of their fighters into the army; and the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees, some of whom have been displaced since the 1990s.

The group also regularly brings attention to the long-standing discrimination of Tutsi communities in DRC, though many feel that is a pretext for the insurgency since there was no documented increase in discrimination in the lead-up to the rebellion in 2021.

With the creation of the AFC, in December 2023, the M23 has been developing a more national agenda, with much of it articulated by AFC head Corneille Nangaa, the former president of the Congolese electoral commission.

“There is an intention to legitimise the rebellion, to give it a broader Congolese face beyond a specific community, with Nangaa and his close circle now clearly interested in national aims,” said Josaphat Musamba, a Congolese researcher.

Nangaa led the electoral commission during the contested 2018 election that put Tshisekedi in power (despite another candidate winning the vote). He is now leading an insurgency against the head of state he helped install.

Many of the political and communication advisors surrounding Nangaa were figures in the party of Joseph Kabila, who preceded Tshisekedi. This had led Tshisekedii to accuse Kabila of backing the AFC.

Nangaa and his allies frequently criticise Tshisekedi’s governance record, tapping into growing public discontent as the president has cracked down on opposition groups and attempted to amend the constitution to extend his rule.

Interviewed last month, Nangaa, who had swapped his military gear for civilian clothing, emphasised the group’s national ambitions.

“The objective is the liberation of our population against this corrupt regime,” said Nangaa, wearing a black zip-up jacket and a cap of the same colour, which bore the eagle logo of the AFC.

“The balkanisation of Congo is not on our agenda, but in the meantime the space where we are today has been liberated,” Nangaa said. He said these territories will be ruled “autonomously”, and that the takeover is not an “occupation” but a “revolution”.

For many Congolese, these words evoke a sense of déjà vu. In 1996, another Congolese rebel leader – backed by Rwanda and Uganda – launched a rebellion that marched to Kinshasa. That man was Laurent-Désiré Kabila (father of Joseph Kabila).

The army of then-president Mobutu Sese Seko – who had ruled DRC (it was called Zaïre at the time) for more than 30 years – crumbled as Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s rebel outfit, the AFDL, swept through the country.

Onesphore Sematumba, of the International Crisis Group (ICG), said the context today differs in that the international community was tired of Mobutu – and is less so with Tshisekedi. Still, he said, “the balance of power on the ground is not in [Tshisekedi’s] favour.”

For the moment, the likelihood of the rebel alliance taking over Kinshasa, some 1,000 miles to the west, seems slim. Whether the M23’s military leaders and their Rwandan backers have the same national vision as Nangaa is also unclear.

For now, the rebels are seizing new territory, capturing Walikale, a town in North Kivu, while travelling through South Kivu’s Hauts-Plateaux region, and eying up the major city of Kisangani, and the south-eastern copper-mining heartland of Katanga.

The group has demonstrated its ability to quickly gain ground, and by seizing military equipment abandoned in recent weeks by the Congolese army and allied Romanian private military contractors, it has also significantly strengthened its capabilities.

What does Rwanda want?

Rwanda presents its interests in DRC as security related, maintaining that its priority is to destroy the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a group founded in eastern DRC by Hutu extremists who perpetrated the 1994 genocide.

Kigali, which has been using the same justification for backing Congolese rebel movements since the 1990s, has criticised the Congolese army for collaborating with the FDLR, and for imperilling Tutsi communities.

Rwanda has legitimate concerns related to the FDLR – and the genocide remains deeply ingrained in Rwandan society – but most researchers agree that recent collaborations were initiated by the Congolese army to counter the M23, and were not the proximate trigger of the insurgency.

It is widely believed that Rwanda began backing the M23 to maintain influence in eastern DRC – an area it sees as its strategic backyard – amid growing competition from regional rivals, especially Uganda.

Historical claims have also been at play – Rwandan officials have long claimed that parts of eastern DRC were once Rwandan land, taken away during the colonial period – as are economic motives to exploit a mineral-rich region.

“There are multiple reasons for Rwanda’s involvement, among which are an expansionist aim and the access to resources,” said Laurent Munyandilikirwa, a Rwandan human rights lawyer who lives in exile.

Munyandilikirwa said he doesn’t believe in the security-related argument that Rwanda is putting forward around the FLDR, which is much less powerful than it used to be and rarely threatens Rwanda.

With the prospect of the M23 controlling the entirety of North Kivu and South Kivu, Rwanda could effectively be gaining an area several times its size. Still, analysts who spoke to The New Humanitarian said it is unlikely it will formally annex the region as this would be too blatant a violation of international law.

Instead, many think Kigali will be satisfied with installing a friendly administration under the M23/AFC that allows it to maintain a sphere of influence in eastern DRC, preserving both its economic as well as security interests.

Will international pressure and peace talks help?

International criticism of Rwanda had been limited since the M23 insurgency began, particularly among its largest Western donors. However, that has begun to change since the takeover of Goma.

In recent weeks, the US, the UK, Canada, Germany, Belgium and the EU have all announced sanctions against M23 leaders and Rwandan officials and/or halted their aid to Kigali. Kagame has acted unbothered, but the pressure could still force his hand, Munyandilikirwa said.

“He knows that Rwanda needs development aid and cooperation,” the rights activist said. “This helps pay the salaries of civil servants, and even the military. If funding stops, poverty will increase.”

Back in 2012, international pressure pushed Rwanda to sever ties with the M23, which eventually surrendered. However, the current context is different, with Rwanda having strengthened its influence both in Africa and on the international stage.

Seeking to resolve the conflict, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) – DRC is a member of both – have intensified their engagements in recent weeks, without much success.

The AU has also mandated Angolan President João Lourenço to act as a mediator in the crisis, with Luanda announcing that direct talks between the two sides would take place this week. However, the M23, after complaining bitterly that the DRC presidency was refusing negotiations, ultimately rejected the talks, citing “successive sanctions imposed on our members”.

Congolese political analyst Christian Moleka said Kinshasa has no choice but to accept negotiations with the M23, but suggested that some advisers around Tshisekedi don’t want talks. “The politicians in Kinshasa are very divided,” he said.

Moleka said the M23 are unlikely to accept previous arrangements that had been discussed by DRC and Rwanda as part of Angolan and EAC mediations. These included provisions for the rebel group to withdraw and canton its troops.

“They can’t be treated like any other armed group when they control big chunks of provinces,” Moleka said.

Sematumba of the ICG agrees that if direct talks do happen, Kinshasa will likely demand the withdrawal of the M23 and Rwandan troops, but neither will accept it “as they have the upper hand”. Sematumba says the integration of the rebels into the Congolese army and other power-sharing arrangements will also be on the table, reflecting strategies used in past peace processes with Rwanda-backed rebellions.

“They never addressed the deeper issues, but I don’t see how they will avoid similar arrangements this time,” Sematumba opines.

Will regional tensions worsen?

Many analysts have drawn comparisons between the current conflict and the Second Congo War (1998–2003), which involved numerous African countries. Yet the risks of a further regional escalation may be decreasing.

A SADC summit on March 13 ended the mandate of its military mission in DRC – SAMI-DRC – and ordered the start of a phased withdrawal of its troops from the country.

Burundi, which was providing key support to the Congolese army, has also withdrawn some of its troops from the front. The proximity of the fighting to the Burundian border risked leading to a direct confrontation between Burundi and Rwanda.

Uganda has been playing a more ambiguous role. In 2021, it deployed troops to help DRC fight the Allied Democratic Forces, a rebel group of Ugandan origins based in the east, and to construct roads that would boost trade between the countries.

Since then, however, UN experts have accused Kampala of supporting the M23, allowing it to use its territory as a rear base. Last month, Ugandan troops expanded their presence in north-eastern Ituri Province, which is close to M23-held areas.

Both Uganda and Rwanda use smuggled Congolese minerals to boost their exports. While not the primary cause of conflict, some armed groups, including the M23, also benefit from their extraction, as do international corporations, which reap vast profits as many Congolese remain in poverty.

• A Tell Media report