
When China opened a naval base in Djibouti in 2017, it marked its next step in expanding its expeditionary capabilities in Africa. Having first denied that its investment in a civilian port would be upgraded for military purposes, Chinese officials sought to downplay its military significance by citing their peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and antipiracy contributions.
Nonetheless, terms like “power projection,” and “improved out-of-area operations” feature prominently in Chinese official and nonofficial characterisations of the base.
The 2018-2019 training cycle witnessed a heightened regularity of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) drills, likely due to improved access, proximity, planning and logistics provided by the new base in Djibouti. In 2018 alone, the PLA conducted six exercises – its highest in a single year in Africa – with Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria (twice) and South Africa.
China also started participating in other multinational exercises. Exercise “Eku Kugbe,” hosted by Nigeria in May 2018, focused on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. China deployed the Type 054 frigate Yenchang to join 12 Nigerian warships and one each from Cameroon, France, Ghana and Togo. Exercise “Mosi,” held in November 2019, brought China, Russia, and South Africa together for the first time for maritime security drills. This included surface gunnery, helicopter cross-deck landings, rescue of hijacked vessels, and disaster control. South Africa and China deployed a frigate each. South Africa also deployed naval aircraft and a fleet replenishment ship, SAS Drakensburg. Russia deployed a Slava-class cruiser, Marshall Ustinov, a sea-going tanker, and rescue tug Vyazma.
Later in 2019, 300 troops from the PLA Eastern Theatre Command’s 73rd Group Army arrived at Tanzania’s Comprehensive Training Centre for a 25-day exercise “Sincere Partners 2019.” Tanzanian and Chinese ground forces engaged in a live-fire exercise, civilian search and rescue, unmanned aerial vehicle tactics, blasting operations, built-up area search and rescue, and a command post simulation. It was the largest PLA drill of its kind at the time.
This tempo resumed in 2023 after a pause during Covid. Exercise “Mosi II,” held in February off South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal coast, coincided with the first anniversary of Russia’s re-invasion of Ukraine. Russia deployed a frigate loaded with Zircon hypersonic missiles, reportedly used to strike the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, that month.
“Beyond 2023,” the third Sino-Tanzanian drill, took place in September, this time with mixed Chinese and Tanzanian task groups and integrated command and control. In June 2024, the PLA Navy’s 46th ETG participated in a Nigeria-hosted multinational counterpiracy drill featuring 10 warships from Brazil and Cameroon as well as China and Nigeria. This built upon four Sino-Nigerian exercises since 2014 (two bilateral and two multilateral).
This review highlights that much of the infrastructure China is using to expand its military footprint in Africa was built up over time. Tanzania’s Chinese-built facilities like Kigamboni Naval Base, Ngerengere Air Force Base, and the Comprehensive Training Centre in Mapinga, have all hosted PLA drills and military events. Chinese-built ports in Cameroon, Ghana, Namibia, and Nigeria have hosted PLA Navy port calls prior to joint exercises, as have others. The PLA’s Peace Unity-2024 exercises – China’s largest to date – also reflects a gradual evolution, not a sudden departure, in the militarization of China’s Africa policy.
The PLA sees Africa as a stepping stone for “far seas operations” (yuan hai fangwei). Senior Colonel (retire) Zhou Bo, who commanded PLA antipiracy missions in Africa from 2009-2015, explains,
“If you ask me, when is the time that the PLA Navy became a blue water navy, I would argue that it was at the end of 2008, when PLA flotillas went to the Gulf of Aden for counterpiracy operations. This kind of combat mission, although against pirates, [was] really a kind of military operation that we conducted far away from the Chinese coast, and we had non-stop exercises. And it is still continuing. … After finishing the missions in the Gulf of Aden each time, that is roughly about three months, then these ships would sail around the world to familiarize themselves with uncharted waters, be it the Atlantic Ocean, be it in the Bering Sea, be it in the Mediterranean. So, it’s no longer three-month missions. Sometimes it could even last for 10 months. So that is why we are making progress in our own way, without fighting a war.”
China benefits from the low priority accorded Africa by the global media and major powers. This has made it easier for the PLA to build up its military footprint in Africa without attracting attention.
China also gains from the longer deployment distances involved in its expanded military engagements in Africa. This has been relevant for practicing power projection and experimentation, while providing the PLA realistic training gained from Africa’s complex security environment. China similarly benefits from the low priority accorded Africa by the global media and major powers. This has made it easier for the PLA to build up its military footprint in Africa without attracting attention.
African governments defend their decision to collaborate with China’s military, citing the benefits of learning from a rapidly modernizing PLA. Views from outside government are more critical. One Kenyan commentator called Peace Unity-2024 a “covert plan by the Chinese to set up a military base within Tanzania.” A Tanzanian commentator argued that China’s military influence in Tanzania could alter Tanzania’s non-alignment posture, move it closer to China’s geopolitical camp, and “away from [the Non-Aligned Movement’s] commitment to disarmament and peace.”
China’s military strategy in Africa is advancing China’s goal of achieving “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation by 2049.” To that end, the PLA is tasked with becoming a “world-class force” by 2030 with the requisite combat and power projection capabilities to defend China’s expanding global interests and win future wars closer to home waters. While certain African countries defend enabling China’s growing militarisation on capacity-building grounds, others are concerned that Africa should better manage its military partnerships so as not to bring the continent into the centre of the very geostrategic rivalries African governments say they want to avoid.
- An Africa Centre for Strategic Studies report