African countries seek to rebalance their ties with China toward debt sustainability, value addition, and industrialisation to move toward a more equal and transparent partnership that prioritises long-term African development.

Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Politburo Member Wang Yi’s annual inaugural visit to Africa in January sets the tone for Africa-China relations each year. A diplomatic tradition observed since 1991, the trip is Wang’s 63rd visit to Africa since 2013. He has advanced a five-point agenda:

Accelerating implementation of the 2024-2027 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Action Plan ahead of the 2027 FOCAC summit in the Republic of the Congo

Consolidating critical mineral supply chains

Deepening political party-to-party and government-to-government ties

Expanding security cooperation and military modernisation

Securing African diplomatic support for China’s broader geostrategic initiatives at the global level

These priorities underscore a Chinese approach that seeks to align its economic, security and diplomatic interests in Africa.

African countries’ collective policy objectives, by contrast, remain less clearly articulated. To help unpack African perspectives and strategic trade-offs, the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies spoke with Ambassador Fred Ngoga, who coordinates external partnerships for the African Union (AU), including relations with China.

What are Africa’s key priorities in dealing with China?

Our relationship with China is shifting from a focus on aid and infrastructure toward a more strategic partnership aligned with Agenda 2063 and long-term development goals. A central priority is making debt more sustainable and manageable. While all economies, including advanced ones, rely on borrowing, we in Africa pay significantly higher interest rates, diverting scarce resources from education, social services and investment.

Through the G-20 Common Framework, G-20 African Compact and bilateral mechanisms, African countries are working with China on debt restructuring, refinancing, interest-free loan cancellations and currency conversions. Lowering interest rates and easing repayment pressures is surely a win-win – it enhances socioeconomic outcomes while reducing the risk of defaults on Chinese debt.

Africa’s debt stock is roughly 43 per cent private, 34 per cent multilateral, and 23 per cent bilateral, with China being the largest bilateral lender. African countries are aiming to secure more concessional, lower-interest financing and avoid the costly loans that contributed to the debt crises of the 1990s. Poorly managed debt, policymakers recognise, can undermine sovereignty and resilience.

Industrialisation and value addition now dominate Africa-China negotiations.

Industrialisation and value addition now dominate Africa-China negotiations. This is a strategic issue for Africa – one that takes on greater significance given the renewed global demand for critical minerals, including rare earth metals. African governments are resisting the old extractive model that exports raw materials and imports manufactured goods.

Many governments are encouraging local manufacturing, assembly, technology transfer and integration into global supply chains. Namibia plans to convert nearly 100,000 vehicles to electric by 2025, and Ethiopia aims for 500,000 electric vehicles (EVs) by 2030 after banning new combustible-vehicle imports.

Kenya is now building its own electric vehicles (EVs). The only components they import from China are battery components, with plans to attain full cycle manufacturing in the next few years.

Growing numbers of African countries are assembling electric buses, motorcycles and public service vehicles. Countries are enacting policies to require more technology transfer from foreign (including Chinese) partners with the aim of boosting local production, incentivising value addition of critical minerals and establishing new supply chains.

Infrastructure cooperation is increasingly tied to regional integration under the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), Agenda 2063 and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), correcting past megaprojects that lacked coherence. Across all these areas, African policymakers are asserting greater agency to ensure Chinese investment supports inclusive and sustainable development.

How successful have African countries been in putting these priorities on the FOCAC agenda?

African countries have achieved uneven but meaningful progress in advancing their priorities through FOCAC. At the 2024 FOCAC summit, we placed debt sustainability at the centre of discussions, urging financing models that move beyond high-interest commercial loans. China responded by pledging to restructure or cancel portions of bilateral debt and signalled interest in more flexible instruments such as green bonds and blended finance. Moving from commitments and pledges to actual implementation is a process on its own, however, with some countries making more progress than others.

Industrialisation saw clearer gains. Countries like Nigeria, Ethiopia and Senegal secured expanded Chinese support for special economic zones, industrial parks and local processing plants. These projects increasingly align with African goals for value addition and job creation rather than simply serving Chinese export needs. Trade diversification, however, has lagged. African countries welcomed China’s tariff-free treatment for all AU members apart from Eswatini.

However, many countries continue to face significant nontariff barriers in exporting materials to China – including phytosanitary restrictions, cumbersome customs procedures and weak logistics – especially in agriculture and textiles.

Security cooperation also advanced modestly. African delegations emphasised threats like terrorism, piracy and regional instability. China committed to additional peacekeeping training, professional military education and logistics support. African countries, however, are keen to avoid Beijing taking on a heavy combat posture, as the areas of cooperation we seek from China do not require it.

When it comes to geostrategic considerations, the African diplomatic custom is to seek strategic balance among major powers. African countries will maintain military and defence partnerships based on the value each partner brings to the table in terms of specialisation. This is critically important. Here at the African Union Commission (AUC), our strategy is to avoid being pulled into geostrategic orbits and to maintain a posture of working evenly with major powers across the board.

On climate resilience, progress remains limited. Although we reached consensus on green development, shifting from fossil-fuel projects to renewable energy will require stronger institutional commitments in future FOCAC rounds.

What are African countries doing to monitor implementation of FOCAC outcomes?

A major recent development is the expanded use of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). Originally designed to evaluate governance standards, the APRM is now also being used to assess the transparency and impact of foreign partnerships, including those funded by China. This marks a broader shift toward integrating oversight of external investments into Africa’s governance architecture.

The aim is to ensure these partnerships support national development and Africa-wide strategic priorities, while meeting transparency and accountability standards. At the continental level, the AUC collaborates with Chinese counterparts to monitor implementation of FOCAC commitments.

Many bilateral agreements, including those involving Chinese financing, remain opaque.

However, these joint oversight mechanisms often suffer from bureaucratic inefficiencies and limited public visibility. This weakens their credibility and reduces their ability to influence policy effectively.

National governments have taken additional steps. Countries such as Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia have established inter-ministerial taskforces dedicated to overseeing Chinese-financed infrastructure projects. These bodies track project progress, enforce contract terms and evaluate socioeconomic impacts. Their effectiveness, however, varies widely. Many face challenges, including weak institutional capacity, shifting political priorities and inadequate access to reliable data.

Alongside official efforts, African think-tanks, research institutions and civil society organisations (CSOs) are becoming more active in scrutinising China-Africa cooperation. Some of these groups work directly with the AU to provide research insights, strengthen oversight frameworks and support public accountability.

Their analyses frequently highlight issues such as environmental risks, labour practices and financial transparency – areas where concerns often emerge in large-scale foreign-funded projects.

• A Tell Media report / Republished from Africa Centre for Strategic Studies