China’s support to junta-led regimes in West Africa has raised fundamental questions about the impact of Chinese security assistance on popular sovereignty and state fragility.

In line with the 2024-2027 FOCAC Plan, China has become the leading arms supplier in West Africa (and second largest for the continent overall). This includes the Sahel, where Chinese military assistance to junta-led regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger has generated controversy.

These juntas have been sanctioned and suspended by the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), placing Beijing at odds with African regional bodies’ norms against unconstitutional seizures of power. China’s continued support to these regimes exposes tensions in China-Africa security relations and raises questions about the impact of Chinese security assistance on popular sovereignty and state fragility.

The 9th FOCAC Summit in 2024 designated Africa a “demonstration zone” for China’s GSI. Since September 2024, at least 10 GSI-linked activities have been operationalized. Among other objectives, the GSI prioritizes regime security (described in Chinese ruling party literature as “stability maintenance” or weiwen).

In addition to military support and in line with GSI formulations, China has also become more active in domestic law enforcement training and norms in Africa. Since 2024, China and African governments have held four multilateral ministerial level law-enforcement gatherings, including the:

In September 2025, officials from 40 African countries attended the Global Public Security Cooperation Forum (Lianyungang Forum), where GSI-linked public security cooperation featured prominently. China’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS), the lead GSI implementing agency, convened the event.

China-led security platforms carry major implications for African domestic security norms, governance, and strategic autonomy.

African engagement has also expanded in Chinese-led security forums, including the Beijing Xiangshan Forum, hosted by the Academy of Military Science, which formulates Chinese military strategy and advises the Central Military Commission. While the forum was initially exclusively focused on the Asia-Pacific, it has included African delegations since 2019 and is sometimes synchronised with FOCAC’s China-Africa Peace and Security Forum.

The FOCAC Legal Forum and the China-Africa Prosecutorial Cooperation Forum are other venues China uses to reinforce its security outreach. These forums train African judicial officials and paralegals, promote legal integration, and expand law enforcement cooperation.

China’s growing role in shaping Africa’s domestic security structures is causing increasing concern. Analysis by African scholars shows that that such assistance strengthens the coercive capacity of recipient governments, contributes to human rights violations, and enables the repression of opposition parties.

Illustratively, the transfer of military arms, radio jamming devices, surveillance technology, bugging equipment and water cannons to Zimbabwean security forces enabled the government of Robert Mugabe to block broadcasts of independent media outlets, eavesdrop on opposition activists and suppress rallies and protests – practices that have continued under Emmerson Mnangagwa.

Analysis by African scholars shows that Chinese security assistance strengthens the coercive capacity of recipient governments, contributes to human rights violations and enables the repression of opposition parties.

Pressure by African civic coalitions has helped shape AU and regional policies on arms transfers, including oversight, accountability and preventing uncontrolled transfers during sensitive events like elections. Nonetheless, concerns about the policy implications of Chinese transfers in fragile and authoritarian contexts will continue to grow as China’s Ministry of Public Security conducts more African engagements than China’s Ministry of Defence and the PLA, often outside public scrutiny.

The Chinese-led BRICS naval exercises held in 2026 should be understood as part of a systemic effort to expand Beijing’s military presence on the continent while bringing African countries within China’s global security frameworks. This growing integration poses potential risks to African countries’ frequently stated desire to remain unaligned amid geostrategic rivalries.

The growing militarization of China’s Africa policy also risks distracting from Africa’s priorities for its relationship with Beijing – to advance sustainable development through greater infrastructural development, investment, African valuation over supply chains and skills enhancement.

African reactions to these developments are reflected in competing perspectives:

Hedging. This view from some African governments holds that deeper engagement with Chinese security architectures diversifies foreign partnerships. This ensures access to Chinese security assistance on relatively cheaper terms, positions African countries to secure larger Chinese economic support and underscores African countries’ right to select and balance their international partners.

Regime security. Ruling parties preoccupied with survival believe they can leverage their access to Chinese security funding and equipment to bypass Western sanctions (if those exist), strengthen their regime’s hold on political power, subdue opposition parties, and enhance diplomatic legitimacy.

These competing perspectives point to the need for African countries to formulate national strategies for engaging China.

Threat to democracy. Many African civil society and democracy advocates believe uncontrolled and unaccountable Chinese security cooperation can entrench repression, especially in contexts where governments have taken an authoritarian turn. According to this perspective, the adoption of Chinese domestic security practices without citizen oversight will contribute to worsening of human rights, shrinking democratic space, and weaker government accountability.

Strategic autonomy. African countries can engage China in ways that avoid bloc entrapment, respect public demands for oversight and accountability, advance African countries’ national interests, and achieve balance and sustainable outcomes. This requires the formulation of whole-of-government national strategies to engage China in a more equal and transparent manner as well as greater coordination at the national, regional economic community and AU level.

These competing perspectives point to the need for African countries to formulate national strategies for engaging China (and other foreign powers) to ensure these arrangements advance African national security interests. At the regional level, AU resolutions on establishing a secretariat for China coordination and increasing the regional body’s representational authority should be implemented to support national oversight.

Toward this end, the AU and its relevant organs should continue engaging African non-governmental professionals and coalitions to mobilise expertise and ensure the representation of citizen interests. Finally, the AU and African governments should strengthen platforms for regularly sharing best practices for constructively engaging China.

Adopting transparent assessment processes can advance the pursuit of security pathways that are consistent with African interests.

China’s efforts to bring African countries into its geostrategic fold through BRICS-Plus, GSI and other China-led security platforms carry major implications for African domestic security norms, governance, and strategic autonomy. To safeguard African interests, policymakers and thought leaders must critically assess the domestic and foreign policy risks and opportunities of such alignments. Adopting such systematic and transparent assessment processes can advance the pursuit of security pathways that are consistent with African interests of nonalignment, sustainability, and citizen-centred governance.

• A Tell Media report / Republished from Africa Centre for Strategic Studies