China’s continued efforts to integrate African governments into China’s global security architectures risk Africa’s longstanding preference to avoid being pulled into competing geopolitical camps.

The January 2026 Exercise Will for Peace –  a nine-day BRICS Plus naval exercise led by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – underscored China’s growing use of military power in Africa to advance Chinese geostrategic objectives.

Involving Russian, Iranian and South African as well as Chinese naval forces off South Africa’s Western Cape, the exercises reinforce China’s role as the primary convening power of this emerging security bloc.

The exercise appears to be an attempt to normalise military cooperation within BRICS Plus without formally declaring a military alliance. Although BRICS – a loose coalition of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – was originally conceived of as an economic bloc, it has increasingly undertaken geopolitical engagements.

African countries risk deeper entanglement in China’s geopolitical bloc without clear external engagement strategies that define long-term national interests.

Iran’s first-ever participation marks a significant departure from previous iterations of Russian, Chinese, and South African naval exercises and aligns with China’s broader objective of expanding the security dimension of the BRICS Plus alliance (the bloc added Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025).

The deeper political significance of Iran’s inclusion was made particularly stark given that, at the time of the naval exercises, Iranian authorities were conducting a brutal crackdown on protesters that resulted in the deaths of an estimated 6,000 to 12,000 Iranian civilians. The symbolism of these actions for the exercises and the BRIC-Plus alliance more generally drew extensive domestic criticism in South Africa.

African governments defend their military engagements with China as needed to address Africa’s pressing development and security priorities and as a means of maintaining relations with all partners within a shifting global geostrategic landscape.

Nonetheless, concerns persist that African countries risk deeper entanglement in China’s geopolitical bloc without clear external engagement strategies that define long-term national interests, systematically assess partners, and allow for policy recalibration – capabilities that remain underdeveloped.

China invests heavily in securing African participation in Chinese-led global institutions to enhance their legitimacy, build regional voting blocs and strengthen China’s leverage amid global rivalries. Beijing has spearheaded BRICS expansion and promoted deeper political and security cooperation under frameworks such as the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and One Belt One Road, also called the Belt and Road Initiative.

Chinese policymakers view BRICS-Plus as part of an alternative global security and geopolitical architecture.

Chinese policymakers view BRICS-Plus as part of an alternative global security and geopolitical architecture intended to counterbalance Western and US-led institutions. China was the leading advocate for expanding membership in 2024 as well as adding prospective members including Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda and Uzbekistan.

Beijing has also driven political and security coordination within BRICS, including a standing forum for national security advisors, which has convened 15 times since 2009. China has further expanded professional military education (PME) exchanges and military exercises involving BRICS-Plus members, while avoiding formally labelling the bloc as a military alliance.

The effort to normalise BRICS-Plus security cooperation in an African context aims to build on previous Chinese multilateral military drills. The PLA has conducted between 80-100 joint drills with Russia since 2003. China has also participated in roughly a dozen exercises with Russia and Iran and three with Russia and South Africa since 2019.

The Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) Beijing Action Plan (2024-2027) is notable for having more military and security commitments than any previous plans, including explicit integration within GSI, joint exercises, PME training of 6,500 African military and police personnel by September 2027  and defence and security coordination.

The PLA has conducted three military exercises in Africa in the past 18 months, each signalling a qualitative shift. In August 2024, the two-week Amani na Umoja (Peace and Unity) exercises with Tanzania and Mozambique represented the largest ever PLA deployment in Africa. Unlike past drills that relied on PLA Navy anti-piracy escort task groups in the Gulf of Aden, this exercise deployed units directly from mainland China, employing naval and air force strategic lift, including Y-20 transport aircraft and Yuzhao-class amphibious landing docks.

It featured both land operations in Tanzania and naval operations in Mozambican waters, marking a first in PLA Africa exercises.

Amani na Umoja included a battalion-sized deployment of Chinese ground, air, marine and special forces, and the first inclusion of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force and the PLA Information Support Force in Africa. Both structures are designed to strengthen China’s expeditionary or “far seas” operations. The drill also incorporated unscripted opposing forces, combined-arms manoeuvres, and amphibious landings, capabilities not previously demonstrated in PLA exercises in Africa.

Momentum continued to build in April 2025 when the PLA Air Force and Egyptian Air Force conducted the 18-day Eagles of Civilization drill, China’s first air-force exercise in Africa. It again relied on Y-20 aircraft to deploy personnel from China, supported by YY-20 aerial refuelling tankers, at least six J-10C fighter jets, J-10S trainer jets and a KJ-500 airborne early warning aircraft.

The exercise emphasised aerial and ground operations, logistics, tactical coordination and real-time combat scenarios, representing a shift away from earlier symbolic or scripted PLA drills.

Chinese military media framed Amani na Umoja 2024 and Eagles of Civilization 2025 as demonstrations of China’s growing power-projection capacity (known in China as “far seas manoeuvring operations.”

The growing militarisation of China’s Africa policy also risks distracting from Africa’s priorities for its relationship with Beijing.

In this context, Will for Peace 2026 is an example of interregional coalition building and interoperability, signalling an expansion from previous Africa region-specific PLA exercises. Chinese analysts have emphasised that it was the first multinational drill held under the BRICS-Plus format. The 2024-2027 FOCAC cycle, furthermore, reflects China’s broadening expansion into “far seas operations” and extra-regional interoperability.

In October 2025, the 48th PLA Navy Escort Task Group (ETG) deployed to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy patrols, continuing a mission that began in 2008 and that also supports port visits, defence diplomacy, joint exercises and non-combat missions such as civilian evacuation. That month, the guided-missile destroyer Baotou, attached to the 47th ETG, conducted a five-day technical port call in Mombasa, Kenya, and then conducted an exercise on passage and manoeuvre with the Kenya Navy. This was the first Chinese naval visit to Kenya in nearly six years.

The PLA Navy conducted at least 15 African port calls between 2024 and 2025, exceeding all previous annual African recorded port-call totals within PLA datasets – underscoring the notable expansion of China’s naval presence, reach and defence diplomacy in Africa.

Between August 2024 and July 2025, China sent troops to participate in Independence Day military parades in Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, and Comoros, an unusual form of defence diplomacy with unclear strategic intent.

• A Tell Media report / Republished from Africa Centre for Strategic Studies