In the short-term, however, scepticism prevails about the success of Gang Suppression Force intervention in Haiti, even those who are in favour of an intervention acknowledge the dangers.

“You have this whole mosaic of violent people using lethal force: the Haitian National Police, this new force, the gangs, the self-defence groups and then the private military and their drones and snipers. That makes it even more volatile, it’s not predictable at all,” William O’Neill, the UN’s independent expert on human rights in Haiti, warned.

According to the latest BINUH – the UN’s office in Haiti – report, more than 60 per cent of gang-related casualties between June and September came during security operations.

One particularly sensitive issue is the higher risk of casualties among Haiti’s youth given how many of them are now forced to join gangs for survival or under coercion. According to UNICEF, minors now make up around half of all gang members.

“The victims are always in the poor neighbourhoods, where gangs are embedded in the community. So when you attack them, you also attack the community.”

An October report published by the National Human Rights Defence Network in Haiti (RNDDH) registered more than 200 gang members killed and over 150 wounded in drone operations since March.

“While notorious gang leaders remain completely unaffected by these kamikaze drone strikes, their foot-soldiers, mostly minors and young adults, are being killed in large numbers,” the document reads.

Resolution 2793 stipulates a strict adherence to all international laws and child protection measures, but some remain unconvinced.

“You can have something on the books, but the question is whether it is actually properly implemented,” said Pamphile. “If the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) has an opportunity to take out Barbecue (Jimmy Chérizier, the leader of the gang coalition Viv Ansanm), for instance, but there are three kids nearby, what will they do? What is the limit?”

If a high number of civilians – and especially children and teenagers – are killed in security operations, the fear is that large sections of the Haitian population could rise up against the GSF and this situation could then play into the favour of the gangs instead of effectively combatting them.

“If, in their operations, they start killing innocent people, and on top of that they kill 14- or 16-year olds, it will be ammo for gang members to create this rallying call, saying that ‘the imperialists are killing innocent people’. This will discredit the GSF,” said Pamphile.

The use of drones, Jean-Mars Biquet, head of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Haiti, suggested, could further intensify the violence, especially as they are typically deployed in lower-income areas.

“The victims are always in the poor neighbourhoods, where gangs are embedded in the community. So when you attack them, you also attack the community,” he said. “At some point, resentment will explode, not only against those who killed children and families, but also against those who are perceived as being spared and being the ones who sent the force to kill them.”

What next, and when do Haitians get their say?

The approval of the GSF has been part of wider efforts by the OAS, CARICOM (the Caribbean regional bloc), and the UN to try to ensure a peaceful transition towards new elections and greater stability after the end of the Transitional Presidential Council’s mandate on February 7, 2026.

On December 1, the CPT approved an electoral decree paving the way for elections to be held in late August and December 2026, and negotiations are still underway to define who will lead the country from February until those elections.

The OAS roadmap envisions support for obtaining political consensus and improving governance, for the electoral process, for humanitarian response, and for the strengthening of sustainable development.

The Caribbean diplomatic source pointed out that this joint work will require a greater level of coordination “to make sure everybody is on the same page”.

But does this “everybody” include Haitians, especially those losing their lives and livelihoods?

“There is a tendency not to take into consideration the advice of locals in the [affected] neighbourhoods,” said Mars. “Many documents are drafted, but no one reads them. It is as if [foreigners] come with a preconceived plan. They don’t speak of the Haitian government and Haitians as central partners in this intervention.”

Mars worries that – as was the case in previous foreign intervention missions – the GSF stakeholders didn’t take the time to consult Haitian civil society, the police, or the Haitian Armed Forces to establish a longer-term strategy that might work.

“This is not only a military matter, it is also a matter of political structure, of mentality, of political personnel, and of internal dialogue among Haitians about the use of armed people to control neighbourhoods and votes,” he said.

Rébu, the former Haitian special forces commander, believes the latest intervention is ill-conceived because it is based on bringing a large amount of security personnel from abroad to fight gangs in the streets, instead of training Haitian forces to help them regain control of the territory, and, more fundamentally, ensuring that the societal root causes of the crisis are addressed.

“The true problem in Haiti is the construction of poverty, the lack of investment in employment and access to education, healthcare, etc.,” he said. “It is this poverty that must be dismantled, and this requires a much more humane, logical, and patient form of governance.”

• A Tell Media report / By Daniela Mohor – The New Humanitarian’s Latin America Editor-at-large, based in Santiago, Chile/ Additional reporting by Milo Milfort in Port-au-Prince