The insurgents’ attack on Palma town on 24 March 2021 presented a real threat to the LNG (liquified natural gas) project. Total had to declare force majeure in April 2021 because of the degrading security situation. In response both SADC (SAMIM) and Rwanda intervened in July 2021.

As a reflection of the critical importance of the LNG project to both the Mozambican government and to the insurgents, the Rwandan military deployed in Palma and Mocimboa da Praia districts. The Rwanda Security Forces (RSF) successfully gained control of both district headquarters by August 2021, less than two months after the initial RSF deployment.

The terrorist group officially began operating as ‘Islamic State Mozambique Province’ in May 2022, identifying itself as such in its communications through IS media channels, as well as in its direct messaging in Cabo Delgado communities.

The number of violent incidents linked to militant Islamist groups in northern Mozambique increased by 29 per cent in 2022 to 437 – a reversal of the 23 per cent drop in 2021. Dislodged from the cities of Palma and Mocimboa da Praia along the coast, smaller groups of militants relocated to more rural districts west and south, preying on villages – committing killings, beheadings, abductions, looting, and the destruction of property.

In 2023, the group was estimated by some to have as few as 300 active fighters, compared to up to 2,500 in 2020. For the first eight months of 2023, ISM was involved in an average of just 11 political violence events per month, compared to an average of 36 per month in 2022.

In terms of funding, international efforts had been undertaken to disrupt the financing of Islamic State Mozambique. “Alarmingly South Africa was named as a major financing hub for ISM. The US designated four ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and ISIS-Mozambique (ISIS-M) financial facilitators based in South Africa.’

Financial sanctions were imposed upon Farhad Hoomer, Siraaj Miller and Abdella Hussein Abadigga for ‘playing an increasingly central role in facilitating the transfer of funds from the top of the ISIS hierarchy to branches across Africa’ or serving as leaders of ISIS cells in South Africa’. An individual known as Peter Charles Mbaga had allegedly also assisted in transferring funds and equipment from South Africa to ISIS-M and sought to procure weapons from Mozambique. South Africa’s financial system had been considerably exploited towards funding ISIS branches and networks across Africa,” MEARI found.

The report added that the concern that South Africa already to some extent is operating as an evolving Islamic State Province in Southern Africa in own right poses a significant threat to South Africa’s national security and regional security if left unchecked. In October 2022, the US embassy in Pretoria issued a security alert about a possible terrorist attack in the upmarket Sandton commercial district. The attack didn’t happen, though this might have been due to heightened security because of the alert.

“South Africa had not suffered any major terrorist attacks over the past few year, but the country remains highly vulnerable to ISIS overtures. Of even greater concern is that the country’s financial system provided a critical conduit for funding extremism.

In February 2023, the Financial Action Task Force placed South Africa on a list of countries under increased monitoring, commonly known as the grey list, after it failed to address all of the shortcomings on preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorism that the task force identified in its 2019 evaluation of the country.”

By July 2023, the insurgency in Mozambique had reportedly killed around 6,700 people and displaced 950,000 more since its inception. As of April 2024, the militants had once again been consolidating territorial gains whilst the Southern African Mission was in the process of withdrawing. More Rwandan forces, however, entered the Mozambican battle space.

“The Mozambican armed forces, the FADM, have so far proven unsuccessful in preventing the growth of militant cells. The improvement of the situation is likely largely attributable to foreign assistance. This began with the deployment of the SAMIM forces from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in July 2021, and the additional support of the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) in December 2022,” MEARI stated.

From May 2023 reports emerged that ISM leadership had adopted a new strategy that excludes excessive violence against civilians. Data released by the non-profit Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) shows a noticeable decline in violence across Cabo Delgado.

While Islamist violence in northern Mozambique dropped 71 per cent between 2022 and 2023, MEARI cautioned that the possibility of the group gaining further ground and recapturing lost ground as 2024 unfolds should not be ruled out.

“In Southern Africa, and despite the worrying developments in Mozambique, South Africa is the country to watch. Like Nigeria in West Africa, South Africa dominates Southern Africa completely. Consequently, what happens in this regional superpower will have a profound impact on its neighbourhood. So, the March 2024 reports that Islamic State continues to receive funds from Johannesburg through robberies and the like is disconcerting to say the least. It suggests the grey-listing of South Africa by the FATF was a prudent measure. It also suggests that because of endemic corruption and the lack of political will on the part of Pretoria, South Africa remains a permissive environment in which terrorists and their networks continue to thrive. Indeed, this has a long history with terrorist and their support networks from Al Qaeda to Hamas and Hezbollah as well as the Taliban finding refuge in the country for three decades. There is a real danger that the war in Gaza, which has been inflaming anti-Israel and anti-West sentiment may well create the ideal opportunity for Islamists to exploit,” MEARI cautioned.

• A Tell report